DIGEST: Tamano vs. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

 

Facts:

On May 31, 1958, Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Sen Tamano) married private respondent Zorayda in civil rites. Sen Tamano died on May 18, 1994 but prior to his death, particularly on June 2, 1993, he also married petitioner Estrellita in civil rites in Lanao del Sur.

On November 23, 1994, respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Sen Tamano and Estrellita on ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Sen Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.

According to the private respondents, Sen Tamano allegedly never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.

Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that: 1.) RTC of QC was without jurisdiction over the complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage and that the “only a party to the marriage” could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse; and 2.) Shari’a courts pursuant to Art 155 of the code of Muslim Personal Laws have jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case since Zorayda and Sen Tamano were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites.

RTC Ruling: RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case of declaration of nullity of marriage was properly cognizable by the RTC since Estrellita and Sen Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with P.D. No 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Petitioner Estrellita filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the orders of respondent presiding Judge Ortiz of RTC denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and reconsideration.

In a resolution dated 13 December 1995, SC referred the case to the CA for consolidation with GR No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib however filed a motion, which the CA granted to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

CA Ruling: CA ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the shari’a courts only when filed in places where there are shari’a courts. But in places where there are no shari’a courts like QC, the instant case could properly be filed before the RTC.

Issue/s: WON the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and try the case at hand?

Held/Ratio:

The instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration is AFFRIMED.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Sen Tamano and Estrellita were married in accordance with the provisions of Civil Code. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Sen Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD 1083. This was however first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the RTC was not divested of jurisdiction to hear or try the instant case despite the allegation on the Motion of Reconsideration that Estrellita and Sen Tamano were married in Muslim rites because a court’s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate fact constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action.

Indeed, Article 13, Title II of PD 1083 states that shari’a courts have jurisdiction over instant cases of marriages and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law; however, this law does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the RTCs are not divested of their general jurisdiction under Sec 19, par (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides-

Sec 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: XXX (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions xxxx

DIGEST: Eisenstadt vs. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

Parties Involved	Thomas S. EISENSTADT, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, Applellant vs. William R. BAIRD, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
Facts	The story starts when the appellee exhibited contraceptive articles during his lecture on contraception and overpopulation then afterwards personally handed a package of contraceptive foam (Emko vaginal foam) to a young woman. Because of this, he was convicted for violating a Massachusetts  statute which makes  it a felony  to sell, lend or give away any contraceptive drug or medicine, instrument or article except in the case of:  a) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person; or b) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician’s prescription.   The appellee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed by the United States (US) District court for the District of Massachusetts; the dismissal however was vacated by the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Court of Appeals holds that the statute is a prohibition on contraception per se and conflicts "with fundamental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. Appellant, inter alia, argues that appellee lacks standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because he was neither an authorized distributor under the statute nor a single person unable to obtain contraceptives   On appeal, US Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.
Issues	W/N William Baird should be convicted for violating the Massachusetts law.
Judgment	US Supreme Court upholds the decision of CA that Baird should not be convicted.
Rationale	I.                    Appellee has standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because their ability to obtain them will be materially impaired by enforcement of the statute. Cf. Griswold, supra; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 . Pp. 443-446. II.                 By providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 446-455.   (a)    The deterrence of fornication, cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute (b)    Similarly, the protection of public health through the regulation of the distribution of potentially harmful articles cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the law, (c)    Nor can the statute be sustained simply as a prohibition on contraception per se, for whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.
Interpretation	Since the statute is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely available for use in premarital sexual [405 U.S. 438, 439]   relations and its scope and penalty structure are inconsistent with that purpose (deterrence of fornication). Pp. 447-450.   If health were the rationale (behind the Massachusetts Law), the statute would be both discriminatory and overbroad, and federal and state laws already regulate the distribution of drugs unsafe for use except under the supervision of a licensed physician. Pp. 450-452.
Major Opinions	In an opinion delivered by Brennan J. it was held that:   I.                    He had a standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives.   The Court of Appeals held that the statute under which Baird was convicted is not a health measure. If that view is correct, we do not see how Baird may be prevented, because he was neither a doctor nor a druggist, from attacking the statute in its alleged discriminatory application to potential distributees. We think, too, that our self-imposed rule against the assertion of third-party rights must be relaxed in this case just as in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra.   The relationship between Baird and those whose rights he seeks to assert is not simply that between a distributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so. The very point of Baird's giving away the vaginal foam was to challenge the Massachusetts statute that limited access to contraceptives… he seeks to assert is the impact of the litigation on the third-party interests. II.                 The statute by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who were similarly situated violated the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment. The question for our determination in this case is whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons under Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, 21 and 21A. 7 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that no such ground exists because: Deterrence of premarital sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its (law) aim. We conclude, accordingly, that, despite the statute's superficial earmarks as a health measure, health, on the face of the statute, may no more reasonably be regarded as its purpose than the deterrence of premarital sexual relations. Whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.
	Douglas J. concurring but would also base the decision on the First Amendment…free speech. (See page 350 ^-^)   White and Blackmun JJ., concurring … The appellee could not constitutionally be convicted for distributing contraceptive foam to a married person and since nothing in the record indicated whether the recipient of the form was married or unmarried… I.                    The State did not purport to charge or convict Baird for distributing to an unmarried person. No proof was offered as to the marital status of the recipient.   II.                 Nothing in the record even suggests that the distribution of vaginal foam should be accompanied by medical advice in order to protect the user's health.
	Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting…   I.                    It is undisputed that appellee is not a physician or pharmacist and was prohibited under Massachusetts law from dispensing contraceptives to anyone, regardless of marital status.   II.                 There is no need to labor this point, however, for everyone seems to agree that if Massachusetts has validly required, as a health measure, that all contraceptives be dispensed by a physician or pursuant to a physician's prescription, then the statutory distinction based on marital status has no bearing on this case.   III.               The appellee has succeeded, it seems, in cloaking his activities in some new permutation of the First Amendment although his conviction rests in fact and law on dispensing a medicinal substance without a license.

x

 

DIGEST: LEVISTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Leviste was charged with the murder of de las Alas. He was convicted by RTC Makati. He appealed his conviction to CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. CA denied application, citing well-established jurisprudence which ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner contends that the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? [Bail NOT automatically granted]

Ratio:  The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. First, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. Second, if one of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph is present, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.

Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. Because of the foregoing, SC ruled that CA did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of SC.

DIGEST: HRS. BURGOS vs. CA, G.R. No. 169711, February 8, 2010

 
Facts: Co is charged with murder and frustrated murder. Co pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing, the RTC granted bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. Heirs of petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC, now presided over by another judge, denied the same. This prompted the victim’s heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the CA. The CA however dismissed the petition for having been filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG), in violation of jurisprudence and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG’s intervention. [CA CORRECTLY dismissed the petition.]

Ratio: The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.

As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. The interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code provides that it is mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.” For that reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule, summarily dismissed. Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction.

DIGEST: Asiaworld Properties Philippine Corporation vs CIR, G.R. No. 171766, 29 July 2010

Doctrine: Once the taxpayer opts to carry-over the excess income tax against the taxes due for the succeeding taxable years, such option is irrevocable for the whole amount of the excess income tax, thus, prohibiting the taxpayer from applying for a refund for that same excess income tax in the next succeeding taxable years. The unutilized excess tax credits will remain in the taxpayer’s account and will be carried over and applied against the taxpayer’s income tax liabilities in the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized.

 

Facts: Petitioner Asiaworld Properties Philippine Corporation (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real estate development. 

- For the calendar year ending 31 December 2001, petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax Return (ITR) on 5 April 2002.

 - In its 2001 ITR, petitioner stated that the amount of P7,468,061.00  representing Prior Year’s Excess Credits was net of year 1999 excess creditable withholding tax to be refunded in the amount of P18,477,144.00.

·       Petitioner also indicated in its 2001 ITR its option to carry-over as tax credit next year/quarter the overpayment of P6,473,959.00. 

- On 9 April 2002, petitioner filed with the Revenue District Office   No. 52, BIR Region VIII, a request for refund in the amount of P18,477,144.00, allegedly representing partial excess creditable tax withheld for the year 2001.

·       Petitioner claimed that it is entitled to the refund of its unapplied creditable withholding taxes.

- Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period provided under Section 229 of the NIRC.

- CTA: denied the petition for lack of merit.

- CA:  

·       under Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997, when the income tax payment is in excess of the total tax due for the entire taxable income of the year, a corporate taxpayer may either carry-over the excess credit to the succeeding taxable years or ask for tax credit or refund of the excess income taxes paid.

·       Section 76 explicitly provides that once the option to carry-over is chosen, such option is irrevocable for that taxable period and the taxpayer is no longer allowed to apply for cash refund or tax credit.

·       In this case, petitioner chose to carry-over the excess tax payment it had made in the taxable year 1999 to be applied to the taxes due for the succeeding taxable years. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner’s choice to carry-over its tax credits for the taxable year 1999 to be applied to its tax liabilities for the succeeding taxable years is irrevocable and petitioner is not allowed to change its choice in the following year. The carry-over of petitioner’s tax credits is not limited only to the following year of 2000 but should be carried-over to the succeeding years until the whole amount has been fully applied. 

          

Issue: Whether the exercise of the option to carry-over the excess income tax credit, which shall be applied against the tax due in the succeeding taxable years, prohibits a claim for refund in the subsequent taxable years for the unused portion of the excess tax credits carried over. – Yes, claim for refund is now prohibited.

 

Ratio:

 

          The resolution of the case involves the interpretation of Section 76[1] of the NIRC of 1997. The confusion lies in the interpretation of the last sentence of the provision which imposes the irrevocability rule.

         

          The Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s view. Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997 clearly states: “Once the option to carry-over and apply the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefore.”  Section 76 expressly states that “the option shall be considered  irrevocable for that taxable period” – referring to the period comprising the “succeeding taxable years.” Section 76 further states that “no application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefore” – referring to “that taxable period” comprising the “succeeding taxable years.”

 

        Under Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997, the application of the option to carry-over the excess creditable tax is not limited only to the immediately following taxable year but extends to the next succeeding taxable years. The clear intent in the amendment under Section 76 is to make the option, once exercised, irrevocable for the “succeeding taxable years.” Thus, once the taxpayer opts to carry-over  the excess income tax against the taxes due for the succeeding  taxable years, such option is irrevocable for the whole amount of the excess income tax, thus, prohibiting the taxpayer from applying for a refund for that same excess income tax in the next succeeding taxable years. The unutilized excess tax credits will remain in the taxpayer’s account and will be carried over and applied against  the taxpayer’s income tax liabilities  in the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized.

        In this case, petitioner opted to  carry-over its 1999 excess income tax as tax credit for the succeeding taxable years. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, such option to carry-over is not limited to the following taxable year 2000, but should apply to the succeeding taxable years until the whole amount of the 1999 creditable withholding tax would be fully utilized.           

 

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[1] SEC. 76. Final Adjustment Return. – Every corporation liable to tax under Section 27 shall file a final adjustment return covering the total taxable income for the preceding calendar or fiscal year. If the sum of the quarterly tax payments made during the said taxable year is not equal to the total tax due on the entire taxable income of that year, the corporation shall either:

 

            (A) Pay the balance of tax still due; or

            (B) Carry-over the excess credit; or

            (C) Be credited or refunded with the excess amount paid,

                   as the case may be.

 

            In case the corporation is entitled to a tax credit or refund of the excess estimated quarterly income taxes paid, the excess amount shown on its final adjustment return may be carried over and credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years. Once the option to carry-over and apply the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefore. (Emphasis supplied)