DIGEST: LEVISTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Leviste was charged with the murder of de las Alas. He was convicted by RTC Makati. He appealed his conviction to CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. CA denied application, citing well-established jurisprudence which ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner contends that the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? [Bail NOT automatically granted]

Ratio:  The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. First, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. Second, if one of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph is present, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.

Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. Because of the foregoing, SC ruled that CA did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of SC.

DIGEST: HRS. BURGOS vs. CA, G.R. No. 169711, February 8, 2010

 
Facts: Co is charged with murder and frustrated murder. Co pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing, the RTC granted bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. Heirs of petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC, now presided over by another judge, denied the same. This prompted the victim’s heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the CA. The CA however dismissed the petition for having been filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG), in violation of jurisprudence and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG’s intervention. [CA CORRECTLY dismissed the petition.]

Ratio: The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.

As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. The interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code provides that it is mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.” For that reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule, summarily dismissed. Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction.