DIGEST: Eisenstadt vs. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

Parties Involved	Thomas S. EISENSTADT, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, Applellant vs. William R. BAIRD, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
Facts	The story starts when the appellee exhibited contraceptive articles during his lecture on contraception and overpopulation then afterwards personally handed a package of contraceptive foam (Emko vaginal foam) to a young woman. Because of this, he was convicted for violating a Massachusetts  statute which makes  it a felony  to sell, lend or give away any contraceptive drug or medicine, instrument or article except in the case of:  a) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person; or b) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician’s prescription.   The appellee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed by the United States (US) District court for the District of Massachusetts; the dismissal however was vacated by the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Court of Appeals holds that the statute is a prohibition on contraception per se and conflicts "with fundamental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. Appellant, inter alia, argues that appellee lacks standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because he was neither an authorized distributor under the statute nor a single person unable to obtain contraceptives   On appeal, US Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.
Issues	W/N William Baird should be convicted for violating the Massachusetts law.
Judgment	US Supreme Court upholds the decision of CA that Baird should not be convicted.
Rationale	I.                    Appellee has standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because their ability to obtain them will be materially impaired by enforcement of the statute. Cf. Griswold, supra; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 . Pp. 443-446. II.                 By providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 446-455.   (a)    The deterrence of fornication, cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute (b)    Similarly, the protection of public health through the regulation of the distribution of potentially harmful articles cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the law, (c)    Nor can the statute be sustained simply as a prohibition on contraception per se, for whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.
Interpretation	Since the statute is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely available for use in premarital sexual [405 U.S. 438, 439]   relations and its scope and penalty structure are inconsistent with that purpose (deterrence of fornication). Pp. 447-450.   If health were the rationale (behind the Massachusetts Law), the statute would be both discriminatory and overbroad, and federal and state laws already regulate the distribution of drugs unsafe for use except under the supervision of a licensed physician. Pp. 450-452.
Major Opinions	In an opinion delivered by Brennan J. it was held that:   I.                    He had a standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives.   The Court of Appeals held that the statute under which Baird was convicted is not a health measure. If that view is correct, we do not see how Baird may be prevented, because he was neither a doctor nor a druggist, from attacking the statute in its alleged discriminatory application to potential distributees. We think, too, that our self-imposed rule against the assertion of third-party rights must be relaxed in this case just as in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra.   The relationship between Baird and those whose rights he seeks to assert is not simply that between a distributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so. The very point of Baird's giving away the vaginal foam was to challenge the Massachusetts statute that limited access to contraceptives… he seeks to assert is the impact of the litigation on the third-party interests. II.                 The statute by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who were similarly situated violated the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment. The question for our determination in this case is whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons under Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, 21 and 21A. 7 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that no such ground exists because: Deterrence of premarital sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its (law) aim. We conclude, accordingly, that, despite the statute's superficial earmarks as a health measure, health, on the face of the statute, may no more reasonably be regarded as its purpose than the deterrence of premarital sexual relations. Whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.
	Douglas J. concurring but would also base the decision on the First Amendment…free speech. (See page 350 ^-^)   White and Blackmun JJ., concurring … The appellee could not constitutionally be convicted for distributing contraceptive foam to a married person and since nothing in the record indicated whether the recipient of the form was married or unmarried… I.                    The State did not purport to charge or convict Baird for distributing to an unmarried person. No proof was offered as to the marital status of the recipient.   II.                 Nothing in the record even suggests that the distribution of vaginal foam should be accompanied by medical advice in order to protect the user's health.
	Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting…   I.                    It is undisputed that appellee is not a physician or pharmacist and was prohibited under Massachusetts law from dispensing contraceptives to anyone, regardless of marital status.   II.                 There is no need to labor this point, however, for everyone seems to agree that if Massachusetts has validly required, as a health measure, that all contraceptives be dispensed by a physician or pursuant to a physician's prescription, then the statutory distinction based on marital status has no bearing on this case.   III.               The appellee has succeeded, it seems, in cloaking his activities in some new permutation of the First Amendment although his conviction rests in fact and law on dispensing a medicinal substance without a license.

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